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Abstract 
 
Various critiques have been made of the analytic narrative, which is a methodological approach that 
combines historically oriented research with rational choice models. This paper discusses strengths and 
limitations of the approach and provides some suggestions for its inclusion in the repertoire of 
methodological tools at disposal for comparative policy studies. The argument is supported by 
evidence provided by the case study of the implementation of the water reform in Italy in the period 
1994-2002. The case study shows how the interplay of game theoretic modeling and historical analysis 
results in the formulation of tentative hypotheses for explaining variation in the observed trajectory of 
policy reform implementation across time and space. 
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Using Analytic Narratives in Policy Analysis:  
An Explanation of the Implementation of the Water Reform in Italy (1994-2002) 
 
 
 Analytic narrative is a methodological approach that aims to reconcile the use of historical and 
comparative research with rational choice models (Bates et al. 1998, 2000, Levi 2002). Building on the 
work of Douglass C. North (1981, 1990, 1996), analytic narratives intend to explain social outcomes on 
the basis of constraints and incentives provided by institutions, which are understood as self-enforcing 
equilibria that coordinate behavior. Analytic narratives – as the phrase suggests – brings together 
analysis and narrative (Levi 2002). The analysis part consists of building models derived from rational 
choice, particularly in the form of extensive form games. The narrative part provides the detailed and 
textured account of context and processes, especially with a focused concern on sequence and 
temporality. Taken together, the analytic narrative contributes explaining a chosen problem or puzzle 
by building a model “to explicate the logic of the explanation”, “to elucidate the key decision points 
and possibilities”, and finally to evaluate the model  “through comparative statics and the testable 
implications the model generates” (Levi 2002: 6).  
 As a research approach, the combination of rational choice with case study narratives 
(especially in the form of game theoretic modeling) has been often applied in works done in political 
science. Instances of such an approach can be found in Kenneth Schultz's (2001) study of the Fashoda 
crisis in 1989, Frank C. Zagare's (2009) work on explaining the outbreak of the 1914 war in Europe, 
and Jay Ulfelder's (2010) oeuvre on dilemmas of democratization. Other examples within the study of 
the policy process include Claudio Radaelli’s (1998) research on the search for coordination in 
international tax policy, Oliver James’ (2003) book on the creation of executive agencies in the UK, 
Shlomo Mizrahi’s (2004) examination of water policy in Israel, and Araral's (2009, 2006) works on the 
strategic interaction between donors and bureaucrats and on the political economy of policy reform in 
the Philippines. Setting aside these (and other) notable examples, however, it is probably fair to assess 
that the analytic narrative approach has not been widely employed as a research strategy so far. When it 
has been used, it has been often put into practice by following the assumptions and the deductive logic 
of rational choice institutionalism as an argumentative heuristics, rather than by developing formal 
game theoretic models (Bennett and Elman, 2006). This state of affairs is relatively surprising, 
provided that both the contribution of case study research and of formal modeling to advancing our 
understanding of the political and policy processes are generally acknowledged (Fiorina 1975, Moe 
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1979, Morrow 1994, Büthe 2002, Steinberg 2007, Clarke and Primo 2012).  
 This paper builds on the presumption that analytic narratives could be more widely used in 
public policy research (including the one of comparative sort) if researchers are more aware of the 
strengths and limitations of the approach and of the circumstances where it can be most effective. One 
reason for the limited diffusion of the approach may be related to the limited number of “showcases” in 
the scholarly literature that expose the use of analytical narratives for explaining paths and outcomes of 
the public policy cycle. In order to help fixing this state of affairs, this paper aims to use the analytic 
narrative approach for explaining a particular episode in contemporary policy history, namely the 
implementation of the 1994 water reform in Italy. 
 The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Next section will review the analytic narrative 
approach and outline some of its strengths and limitations. Section three will illustrate the research 
design of the water reform implementation case study. Section four will present the analytic narrative 
of the case, which – in a typical style of writing of the approach (e.g., Greif, 1998) – goes back and 
forth between the historical narrative of the episode and discussion of formal game theoretic modeling. 
Finally, section five will discuss the findings of the case study and the implications for advancing the 
use of the analytic narrative approach in scholarly inquiry.  
 
Theoretical Background: Analytic Narratives and Its Critiques 
 Analytic narratives are a theoretical approach that aims to show how social outcomes consist 
of self-enforcing equilibria that result from the strategic interaction between actors (Bates et al. 2000, 
Levi 2002). The approach is typically applied by extracting key players, their goals, and the features of 
the environment that influence actors' behavior (especially the rules of interaction, the constraints, and 
the incentives) from narratives of social episodes, and then by defining game theoretic models tailored 
to the specific situations (Levi 2002: 112). Game theoretic models result in sub-game perfect equilibria 
that are compared to the observed behavior. In case of mismatch between the model equilibria and the 
observed behavior, the researcher can revise the model in order to single out the features that better 
account for the observed pattern of choice. Following this method, the researcher proceeds “back and 
forth between the model and the data, testing our ideas against reality” (Bates et al. 2000: 700). The 
approach, therefore, reformulates the issue of explaining social episodes in terms of showing what 
caused a “shift from an institutional equilibrium at one point in time to a different institutional 
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equilibrium at a different point in time” (Levi 2002: 111).  
 Since its formulation (Bates et al. 1998), the analytic narrative approach has been subjected to 
various critiques. Elster's (2000) argued that the recourse to rational choice theory is inadequate 
because people may not conform to canons of instrumental rationality. He questioned whether one can 
believe that actors are able to perform complicated reasoning through inter-dependent (nested) games 
and infinite time horizons, why concerns for fairness or emotions should not play any role in actors' 
decisions, and in what sense preferences could be attributed to aggregate actors. He noticed that 
analytic narratives are not persuasive if little or no evidence is provided for the “mental states” of 
individuals within the described choice settings. He also condemned the explanatory logic of 
constructing models where the case outcome is “explained” by matching the observed behavior with 
the result of choices of actors who seek to maximize suitably defined interests. Bates et al. (2000a) 
addressed Elster's critique by arguing that analytic narratives do not necessarily entail the assumption 
of instrumental rationality only. Alternatively, researchers can use any theory of choice, provided that it 
is sufficiently developed to provide a consistent technique for deducing behavior. They also noticed 
that some rational choice theorists recommend that the researchers develop a “hermeneutic 
understanding” of the experience studied. They objected to Elster's argument that little evidence is 
provided for individual’s “mental states” by pointing out that intentions are too difficult to discern and, 
accordingly, rational choice theorists rightly rely on revealed preferences and behavior. They admitted, 
in part, that Elster's point about giving up the “postulate of hyperrationality” is persuasive, but they also 
contended that the assumption that actors' behavior is instrumentally rational enables parsimonious 
explanations of case outcomes that would not be significantly affected or enriched if embracing 
bounded rationality. 
 Other critiques to analytic narratives have been raised, within a Symposium issue of Social 
Science History (2000), by Daniel Carpenter, Sunita Parikh, and Theda Skocpol. Bates et al. (2006b) 
replied to their comments by acknowledging that the analytic narrative approach was still in its infancy 
and that it constituted an attempt to provide researchers with a more disciplined and rigorous way of 
constructing explanations of specific episodes of history. They admitted that “showcase” examples of 
analytic narratives contained in their 1998 book might not fully appeal to the aesthetic sense of 
historians, because the inclusion of models spoiled the narratives of their literary appeal. In addition, 
they also acknowledged that the focused concern of the cases included in the 1998 book on particular 
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historical and social puzzles could convey the sense that analytic narratives are directed to very 
specialized audiences only. The analytic narratives contained in Bates et al. (1998), indeed, bear the 
risk to remain relatively circumscribed within the narrow task of explaining particular episodes in 
history rather than contributing or calling for a wider cumulative research program.  
 Other sources of criticism to analytic narratives have focused on the extent to which findings 
of this approach result in generalizing theoretical arguments. Levi (2002) acknowledged that the aim of 
analytic narratives is to “go beyond” explaining particular cases and to elaborate more general 
conditions for institutional change. When it comes to matters of research design, however, analytic 
narratives tend to focus on explaining path and outcomes of particular episodes in history that often 
reflect researchers’ specific interests, but typically they do not explicitly contribute to wider research 
efforts to theorize about social phenomena. Admittedly, the criteria for case selection used by analytic 
narrativists “are closer to that of the historian than of generalizing social scientists” (Levi 2002: 7). 
This feature of the analytic narrative approach may be one that calls for more urgent repair. Of course, 
nothing prevents researchers who are specialists in particular areas of social science to employ analytic 
narratives to explain singular occurrences across history and world regions. If the aim of theorizing 
about conditions for institutional change is to be attained, however, the analytic narrative approach 
should be more attentive to issues of research design and case selection.  
 Provided that sources of criticism are persuasively addressed, analytic narratives offer a 
valuable methodological resource for contributing to theory-building efforts. By design, analytic 
narratives typically include exercises of “comparative static” (Levi 2002: 112), where the researcher 
investigates “the effects of different models and context conditions on the path and outcome of 
institutional change” (Bates et al. 2000b: 694). The disciplined comparison between explanations of 
different trajectories of institutional change (between cases or within parts of a given case, across time 
or locations) can provide relevant evidence for the formulation of generalizations that transcend 
historically focused interests. An important condition, in this respect, is that the cases are purposively 
selected (Ragin 1989, Ragin and Becker 1992, Stake 1995, Yin 2003, Gerring 2004, Flyvbjerg 2006, 
Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007). Cases studies that have been categorized by Thomas (2001) as 
‘atheoretical/configurative idiographic’ (i.e., merely illustrative studies) or as ‘disciplined 
configurative’ (i.e., studies where established theories are used to explain a case) result in modest 
theoretical contributions, with respect to works that aim to identify new causal patterns, assess the 
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validity and scope conditions of single or competing theories, explore whether further study is 
necessary, or try to establish common patters for heuristic purposes.  
  
An Analytic Narrative of Policy Reform Implementation: Research Design 
 Regulatory reforms of infrastructure and utilities sectors have attracted considerable scholarly 
attention in the last decades (Armstrong et al. 1999, Baldwin and Cave 1999, Bishop et al. 1995, 
Newbery 2000, Jordana and Levi-Faur 2004, Lodge 2002, Majone 1994, 1996, Thatcher 2002). On the 
basis of evidence collected from episodes of regulatory reforms carried out in various sectors and 
countries, scholarly works highlighted what kind of regulation better fits with the technological, 
economic, and social features of infrastructure industries, especially in relation to the design of 
regulatory institutions, the involvement of private operators and investors in the delivery of 
infrastructure and utility services, and the removal of barriers to competition in whole sectors or in 
selected parts of the industry only (Eberlein 2000, Eberlein and Grande 2000, Gómez Ibáňez 2003, 
Joskow 1996, 1997, Kessides 2004). Relatively few studies have paid attention, however, to the 
implementation stage of regulatory reforms (Dinar 2000, Durant 1984, Gönenç et al. 2001, Hanf 1982, 
Vogel 1998). Yet, the implementation of regulatory reforms is important in order to account for the 
features of any new regulatory regime. Decisions and actions made during the implementation stage of 
regulatory reform policy cycles, in fact, may divert – and possibly significantly reshape – the design of 
the regulatory system originally provided by policy-makers. 
 The issue of how regulatory reforms of infrastructure and utilities sectors are implemented is 
tackled here through the case study of the episode of the implementation of the water reform in Italy in 
the period 1994-2002. The case is selected because of its distinguishing features that call for an 
explanation of variation of the reform implementation trajectory over time and across space. Moving 
from initial conditions that included widespread local government ownership of water firms and high 
fragmentation of the sector, the reform aimed to improve the sorry state of water service performance 
in the country by providing the centralization of water regulatory functions into new sectoral regulatory 
authorities (Autorità degli Ambiti Territoriali Ottimali or OTA authorities). The execution of the 
reform policy mandate, however, was significantly delayed until 1997, when the first OTA authority 
was established in the Alto Valdarno area in Tuscany. From 1998 onward, the implementation of the 
new regulatory system progressed at a faster pace: the total number of OTA authorities raised to 20 by 
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the end of 1998, 30 by the end of 1999, to 48 in 2000, 74 in 2001, and 87 in 2002 – out of a total 
number of 89 which had been provided in regional legislations.  
 The case of the water reform implementation presents, therefore, some intriguing features. 
Why was the water reform not implemented until 1997? Why, instead, did it progress faster from 1997 
onwards? Why was the execution of the water reform mandate faster in Alto Valdarno than elsewhere? 
In part, answers to these questions may relate to the theoretical body on knowledge on policy reform 
implementation, that especially takes into account the role of the political confrontation between 
implementers and target groups (Bardach 1977, Berman 1978, Lipsky 1978, Wildavsky and Majone 
1979, Mazmanian and Sabatier 1981, 1989, Sabatier 1986, Patashnik 2003, 2008). In part, answers 
should also take into account that, within the scenario of a multi-level governance system, sub-national 
governments play an important role as direct providers of public services within their respective 
territorial jurisdictions, bear political responsibility towards local communities, and may exercise 
prerogatives such as veto powers provided by the constitution and/or relevant legislation, the right to 
appeal to supra-national, constitutional, and administrative courts, and exclusive competences on the 
regulation of local public services. Such role is unmatched by the one generally played by actors (such 
as governmental agencies or branches of the executive) that are typically involved in implementing a 
policy reform in unitary countries. 
 The trajectory of the water reform implementation is explained here by contrasting and 
comparing the part of the episode in the period of inertia (1994-1997) with the one of accelerated 
execution of the policy reform mandate (1997-2002); and by contrasting and comparing the part of the 
episode related to the faster trajectory of the water reform implementation in Alto Valdarno (1994-
1997) with the rest of the country in the same period. Designed as such, the case study exploits within-
case variation for articulating a theoretical account of factors and conditions that are relevant for 
explaining the execution of – or the resistance to execute – policy reform mandates.  
 Data were collected from primary, secondary, and tertiary sources. Primary sources included 
parliamentary minutes about the making of the water reform, 35 documents issued by the national 
water regulatory agency (Comitato di Vigilanza per l'Uso delle Risorse Idriche or Supervising 
Committee on the Use of Water Resources), and 20 interviews with informants based in the 
Supervising Committee on the Use of Water Resources (4), in the local regulatory authorities (11), in 
the water firms (3), in the association of water firms Federgasacqua (1), and in the research center 
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Istituto Ricerche Sociali (1). Secondary sources included 23 reports issued by the water research 
centers Proaqua, proceedings of the yearly conferences ‘H2Obiettivo 2000’ organized by the water 
firms' association Federgasacqua, and 546 articles from the business press Il Sole 24 Ore. Tertiary 
sources included various scholarly works done on the water reform in Italy (Massarutto 1993, 2005, 
Bigatti et al., 1997, Guffanti and Merelli 1997, Muraro 2003, Gilardoni and Marangoni 2004, 
Anwandter and Rubino 2006a, 2006b, Citroni and Lippi 2006, Citroni et al. 2007, Lippi et al. 2008, 
and Danesi et al. 2008). 
 Data were stored and coded through the Nvivo software package. Originally, the coding frame 
was based on theoretically derived concepts and constructs that originated from the review of the 
literature on regulation and regulatory reforms. During the process of examining the empirical 
evidence, the coding frame was progressively amended and enriched in order to reflect the variety of 
the discourse carried out in the water policy community in Italy in the period between 1994 and 2002. 
Coded data formed the basis for the analytic narrative, which included both the writing of narratives of 
parts of the episode of the water reform implementation and the design of game theoretic models. The 
design of game theoretic models and their interplay with the historical narrative followed the 
methodological guidelines provided by Bates et al. (1998, 2000), Levi (2002) and Weingast (2005).  
 
An analytic narrative of the implementation of the water reform in Italy (1994-2002) 
Local governments' inertia to define the OTAs (1994-1997) 
 In 1994, the central government of Italy passed a reform of the country’s water sector that 
intended to improve the sorry state of water infrastructure and water service delivery. At that time, the 
water industry was largely fragmented (it counted more than 23,000 firms, mostly owned by local 
governments) and lacked adequate investments. The reform mandated the consolidation of the sector 
by requiring local governments to establish new water administrative areas (Aree Territoriali Ottimali 
or OTAs) and local water regulatory authorities (OTA authorities). OTA authorities were required to 
assign franchises to water firms that could serve each entire OTA on competitive tender basis. The 
reform, therefore, contained provisions for the liberalization of water service provision and its re-
regulation through mechanisms of franchise allocation rather than direct public ownership (Gómez 
Ibáňez 2003).  
After the reform came into force, local governments were expected to formulate proposals 
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about the definition of the boundaries of the OTAs. This task would determine which local 
governments were to collaborate with which others in order to establish new water regulatory 
authorities at the local level (OTA authorities). The design of the OTAs and the establishment of the 
OTA authorities bore important implications for the governance of local water services, especially 
because the centralization of water regulatory functions in the OTA authorities entailed that local 
governments would lose a source of influence on the local water industries. Local governments had 
enjoyed a long tradition of direct ownership and control of water firms that dated back to the early 20th 
century (1903 legislation had allowed local governments to directly manage local public services). 
Sometimes, local politicians had exploited the control on water firms for affecting water-related jobs 
and public contracts, with the intention to cultivate the electoral support of local constituencies. In local 
politicians’ perceptions, benefits from maintenance of status quo conditions could be perceived to 
outweigh those attached to establishing the new water regulatory institutions. 
 
Explaining local governments’ inertia (1994-1997) 
 Why local governments did not execute the mandate of the water reform? In order to tackle 
this question, we model the interaction between local governments in a game theoretic fashion. The 
reform statute provides that any region can enact legislation that establishes the OTAs only after local 
governments agree on the definition of the OTA boundaries. The agreement between local 
governments is conceived as an equilibrium of a coordination game, where local governments choose 
whether to be in accord with neighboring municipalities on the OTA boundaries or not. Let LGi 
indicate any i-th local government within a region. Any LGi plays a coordination game with an 
unspecified number (tens or hundreds, out of about 8,100 municipalities included in the country) of 
neighboring local governments. Any local government could, in principle, negotiate the definition of 
the OTA boundaries with any bordering and surrounding municipalities. Modeling this coordination 
game in detail would be particularly complex, because (a) the number of players of the game is not 
given (i.e., any local government can choose whether to sit at the negotiation table or not) and (b) any 
player can participate to several games at the same time (i.e., any local government can negotiate the 
definition of the OTA boundaries with different sub-sets of municipalities).  
 For the sake of simplicity, let us consider a scenario where two local governments only, LG1 
and LG2, play the coordination game. Players have infinite horizon and a time discount factor of δ ∈ 
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(0,1), that is assumed constant for all players. Each local government can choose whether to agree on 
the definition of OTA boundaries or not. If both local governments do not agree, then they maintain the 
status quo and get nil payoff. If any local government chooses to agree while the other does not, then 
no agreement can be reached and they both get nil payoff. If both local governments agree, then the 
region enacts the legislation that defines the OTA and local governments expect the payoff from 
executing the rest of the water reform statute. This payoff includes (a) the cost Clg1 of losing direct 
control of water planning and regulatory functions (which, if the water reform is implemented, are 
centralized into the OTA authority), (b) the cost Clg2 of losing direct control of water management 
functions (which, if the water reform is implemented, are centralized into the water firm that gets the 
franchise granted by the OTA authority), and (c) the possibility to gain the benefit Blg1 of shared 
influence of larger organizations (i.e., the OTA authority, and possibly the water firm if the franchise is 
awarded to a firm owned by local governments). Costs (Clg1 and Clg2) and benefits (Blg1) take place at 
future times (t1, t2, and t3). Hence, the payoff that each local government can be generally written in the 
form: 
 
 
 Table 1 shows the payoff matrix of the game played by the two local governments. If p lg is 
negative, then the strategy not to define the OTA boundaries (ND) weakly dominates the strategy to 
define the OTA boundaries (D) and the game presents a Nash equilibrium (ND, ND). If plg is positive, 
then strategy D weakly dominates strategy ND and the game has two Nash equilibria, (D, D) and (ND, 
ND). Obviously, the value of plg is higher – ceteris paribus – if local governments believe that pooling 
together water management into larger firms results in greater benefits, that the loss of control of water 
planning and regulatory functions is small, that benefits materialize relatively early with respect to 
costs, and the discount rate is relatively low. What is interesting to notice, however, is that local 
governments may not come to an agreement on the definition of the OTA boundaries even if plg is 
positive. The belief that plg is positive, therefore, is a necessary but not sufficient condition for an 
agreement to define the OTA boundaries.  
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< Insert Table 1 about here > 
 
The execution of the water policy reform mandate (1997-2002) 
 In 1997, the central government launched a program of investments in sewage and wastewater 
treatment infrastructure that aimed to comply with the environmental standards set by 91/271/CE 
directive. The program provided that the central government would assign funds on the basis of 
infrastructure development plans prepared on an OTA-by-OTA basis and that, if the OTAs were not 
established, these water administrative areas would correspond to the territories of the provinces. Local 
governments, who were eager to appropriate funds for infrastructure development within their 
jurisdictions, started to negotiate the definition of the OTAs and the implementation of the other parts 
of the water reform. Within a few years, local governments came to define the OTAs all over the 
country (generally equating, or being very proximate to, the administrative jurisdictions of the 
provinces) and then they proceeded to centralize the water regulatory functions in the OTA authorities. 
By 2002, 87 OTA authorities had been established in the country, out of 89 OTAs that had been 
defined in regional legislations. While the implementation of the water reform had languished during 
the initial period 1994-1997, after a “turning point” in 1997 the process speeded up and resulted in the 
quasi-complete execution of the water policy reform mandate. 
 
Explaining the execution of the water policy reform mandate (1997-2002) 
 Why did local governments accelerate the implementation of the water reform from 1997 
onwards? In order to answer this first question, we model again the interaction between local 
governments as a coordination game in Table 2. Let us assume, for the sake of simplicity, that two 
local governments only (LG1 and LG2) are included in the same OTA. Each local government can 
choose whether to define the OTA (D) or not (ND). After the 1997 legislation, local governments 
expect that the lack of agreement to define the OTA results in the delay of the formulation of 
infrastructure development plans and therefore of the appropriation of funds. Let Clg3 be the cost for 
each local government in case of lack of agreement to define the OTAs. The solution to the game 
shown in Table 2 depends on the relative values of plg and Clg3. If plg is lower than –Clg3, then the game 
presents a Nash equilibrium (ND, ND). If plg is greater than –Clg3, then the game has two Nash 
equilibria (D, D) and (ND, ND).  
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< Insert Table 2 about here > 
 
 The comparison between the two games shown in Tables 1 and 2 suggests that the launch of 
the infrastructure development program in 1997 might have made local governments more likely to 
agree to define the OTA boundaries. Under conditions included in the game shown in Table 2, in fact, 
local government could coordinate their strategies (D, D) even if plg is negative, insofar as it is greater 
than -Clg3. The game shown in Table 2, however, also suggests that the local governments could persist 
in disagreeing on the definition of the OTA boundaries, if they believe that payoff plg from 
coordinating their strategies is negative and lower than –Clg3, or if they believe that the counterpart is 
committed to the status quo. The launch of the infrastructure development program in 1997, therefore, 
provided an incentive (in terms of funding) to the definition of the OTAs, but – by itself – it is not 
sufficient to explain the acceleration of the implementation of the water reform. An additional 
component part of the explanation can be found, however, in a change of beliefs about the effects of 
implementing the water reform and the attitudes of other local governments, that originates from events 
that took place within a particular area of the country, in Alto Valdarno in Tuscany. 
 
The implementation of the water reform in Alto Valdarno (1994-1997) 
 Differently from the rest of Italy, in part of Tuscany the implementation of the water reform 
proceeded at relatively fast pace. In the area called Alto Valdarno, local governments had been 
negotiating the centralization of water service provision since 1990 (Lobina 2005). At that time, the 
local government-owned gas firm Coingas, which was owned by the municipality of Arezzo, proposed 
to the mayor to let the firm develop into a multi-utility company operating in the gas and water 
industries. Supported by the center-left parties that backed up the city executive, in October 1992 
Coingas submitted a plan which provided that the firm would be reincorporated as a ‘municipal 
company’ and would be assigned the water concessions of Arezzo and of other 24 neighboring local 
governments. In 1995, support for the Coingas plan dissolved after the formation of a new center-left 
coalition executive in Arezzo. Following the political orientation of the regional branch of the leftist 
party Democratici di Sinistra (DS), the new mayor favored the formation of mixed public-private 
ownership companies rather than municipal companies for managing local public services. By 1997, 
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Arezzo and the other local governments centralized their regulatory functions into the Alto Valdarno 
OTA authority and established the mixed public-private ownership company Nuove Acque with 
selected business partners (a consortium led by Suez-Lyonnaise dex Eaux).  
 The implementation of the water reform in Alto Valdarno attracted considerable attention 
within the water policy domain. Water policy experts spread accounts of the experience of Arezzo and 
other local governments, especially through the national association of municipal water and gas 
companies Federgasacqua. The “Tuscany model” – as it was called – gradually started to appeal to 
local governments based in other parts of the country as well, especially because it became apparent 
that the centralization of regulatory functions enabled local governments to retain influence on the local 
water industries at a larger scale than the municipal service areas. 
 
Explaining the implementation of the water reform in Alto Valdarno (1994-1997) 
 The interaction between local governments in Alto Valdarno can be modeled in the same 
fashion of the coordination game shown in Table 1. As shown in the first part of the analysis, a positive 
value of plg is a necessary, albeit not sufficient, condition for the coordination between local 
government to define the OTA boundaries. Differently from the rest of the country, initial conditions in 
Alto Valdarno could play an important role in both (a) setting the value of plg as positive and (b) 
inducing local governments to believe that counterparts were positively inclined to coordinate to 
implement the water reform. Local governments of Alto Valdarno area had already negotiated the 
centralization of water management functions well before the enactment of the water reform. Even if 
the negotiation did not result in any reorganization of water service provision, local governments could 
form the belief that future benefits of pooling together the regulation and management of water services 
offset the costs of losing direct control of water firms within their respective municipal service areas. In 
other words, we can hypothesize that past experience of negotiation could facilitate a mechanism of 
emergence of cooperation (Axelrod, 1984) between local governments when they played the game to 
define the boundaries of the OTAs. Local governments of the Alto Valdarno area, moreover, were 
especially receptive of the political orientation of the regional branch of the party Democratici di 
Sinistra (DS), which favored the formation of mixed public-private ownership firms for water service 
provision. Local governments of the area could form the belief that the other municipalities of Alto 
Valdarno shared equivalent views about how to reorganize water firms. Additionally, we can argue that 
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not defining the OTA boundaries bore negative implications, because of the loss of the political capital 
that had been accumulated when forming the consensual view about pooling together the water 
services.  
 
Explaining the role of Alto Valdarno in the implementation of the water reform 
As already discussed, the launch of the infrastructure development program is not sufficient to 
explain the acceleration of the implementation of the water reform after 1997. Events that took place in 
Alto Valdarno in the period 1994-1997, however, may be relevant in this respect. After the 
establishment of the Alto Valdarno OTA authority and the formation of Nuove Acque, local 
governments all over the country became exposed to accounts of the “Tuscany model” that could make 
them believe that the benefits of centralizing water regulatory functions offset the costs. In addition, 
evidence of other local governments’ behavior could stimulate a hypothesized mechanism of imitation 
(Levine and Pesendorfer 2000), which helped strengthening the belief that other local governments 
were becoming inclined to coordinate to implement the water reform.  
 
Conclusion: Explaining Variation across Trajectories of Public Policy Cycles 
 The present case study provides some evidence for explaining variety of the trajectory of the 
water reform implementation across time and space. The comparison between parts of the trajectory of 
the implementation of the water reform in Italy suggests that various factors need to be taken into 
account for explaining the process dynamics of implementing the policy reform. Local governments’ 
inertia to implement the water reform in the period 1994-1977 is especially related to initial conditions 
(the fragmentation of the water industry, diffused local government ownership, and local governments' 
stakes in the local water industries), features of the policy content (the mandate to consolidate water 
services and centralize water regulatory functions), and features of the policy process (the procedural 
rules of the water reform statute that required cooperation between local governments). The 
acceleration of the water reform implementation in the period 1997-2002 is explained taking into 
account features of the policy content (the incentive provided by the infrastructure development 
program) and of the policy process (the diffusion of ideas about the centralization of water regulatory 
functions through the policy community of water experts). Changed beliefs of local governments 
towards the execution of the water policy reform mandate, moreover, have been related to the 
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execution of the water policy reform mandate in Alto Valdarno, whose occurrence is related to special 
features of initial conditions (the negotiated agreement between local governments on the centralization 
of water services) and of the policy process (the formation of an advocacy coalition in favor of 
centralizing water services).  
 In part, these findings from the case corroborate existing generalizing arguments about the 
importance of changes of institutional arrangements and positive feedback effects (Patashnik 2003, 
2008) on the trajectory of policy reform implementation. In part, however, they also suggest some 
qualifications of previous scholarly works. The political confrontation between local governments may 
result in a deadlock of the policy reform implementation process, especially when conditions include 
the presence of a relatively large number of actors who have entrenched stakes in the reformed policy 
domain. In such circumstances, incentives to execute the policy reform mandate may induce reluctant 
implementers to become more favorably inclined towards the reform implementation. It seems, 
however, that (a) past experience of collaboration between the implementers and (b) the activation of 
brokers (McAdam et al. 2001) between different “sites” of reform implementation may help accounting 
for a change of beliefs of the implementers about the net benefits of the execution of the water policy 
mandate and the inclination of the counterparts towards the reform implementation.  
 The present case study suggests how analytic narratives can be employed for explaining 
sources of variation between different public policy cycles, or between different parts of the same 
policy cycle. Working through comparative statics, analytic narratives help to formulate hypotheses 
about the causal relationship between factors, context conditions, mechanisms, and the observed 
features of the policy process to be explained. The logic associated to the recourse to formal modeling 
helps to qualify factors and conditions as either necessary, or sufficient, or both, in order to explain 
variation of the policy trajectory. In addition, the attention paid to the historical evidence helps to 
identify possible sources of causal factors and mechanisms that are brought to bear into the tentative 
explanations. In an iterative fashion, similarities and differences between tentative explanations of 
different cases (or parts within the same case) stimulate further questions about the sources of relevant 
causal factors and mechanisms. 
 Finally, a further issue at stake is what analytic narratives can contribute in addition, or in 
contrast, to alternative approaches to comparative policy research. In the discipline of political science 
in general, several works have discussed the relative strengths and limitations of alternative theoretical 
16 
perspectives, such as rational choice (Levi 1997, Tsebelis 1990), historical institutionalism (Thelen 
1999), and ideational approaches (Schmidt 2010). Similarly to other views (Katznelson and Weingast 
2005), the analytic narratives approach calls for the use of conceptual resources that draw from both the 
rational choice and historical institutionalist perspectives. In doing so, analytic narratives build on the 
capacity of rational choice approach to provide relatively parsimonious explanations with respect to 
other theoretical approaches (Levi 1997). As discussed by Hay (2004), however, the analytical 
parsimony of rational choice is not conducive to explanatory or causal inferences. While the rational 
choice approach can be used as a heuristic analytical strategy, the recourse to the historical part of the 
analysis can help improving the accuracy of explanatory accounts and theoretical generalization.  
 These considerations may bear some relevance for the design of comparative public policy 
studies. Researchers may benefit from the use of formal game theoretic modeling for elucidate the 
assumptions about actors’ preferences and beliefs and illustrate the deductive logic that results in the 
formulation of explanatory hypotheses. In addition, evidence provided by historical narratives can 
result in the re-formulation of the tentative hypothesis, and suggest the identification of factors and 
mechanisms associated to the observed trajectory of the policy cycle.  
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Tables 
 
Table 1. Payoff matrix of local governments' coordination game of defining the OTA boundaries 
(1994-1997). 
  LG1 
  To define the OTA 
boundaries (D) 
Not to define the OTA 
boundaries (ND) 
LG2 
To define the  
OTA boundaries (D) 
plg , plg  0, 0 
Not to define 
the OTA boundaries (ND) 
0, 0 0, 0 
 
 
 
 
Table 2. Payoff matrix of local governments' coordination game of defining the OTA boundaries 
(1997-2002). 
  LG1 
  To define the OTA 
boundaries (D) 
Not to define the OTA 
boundaries (ND) 
LG2 
To define  
the OTA boundaries (D) 
plg , plg  -Clg3, -Clg3 
Not to define  
the OTA boundaries (ND) 
-Clg3, -Clg3 -Clg3, -Clg3 
 
 
 
